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COMMENTS
DAMAGES: EXPERT

TESTIMONY AND FUTURE INFLATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The question of the measure of compensatory damages in personal injury and wrongful death actions is of paramount concern to
both aggrieved parties and defendants. In the determination of total
compensation for the plaintiff, one frequently occurring issuefuture damages-involves complex economic theory and statistical
projections in the computation of such items of prospective loss as
future earnings. At this point in the trial it is crucial that expert
testimony be admitted so that jurors can fathom the technical
complexities of these future financial determinations.'
Inflation has become an accepted ingredient of our contemporary society.' Whether or not a jury should be allowed to consider
testimony by expert economists on possible future rates of inflation,
however, has become a source of controversy in both state and federal courts. The goal of this comment is to survey the current state
of the law on the issue of inflation in personal injury and wrongful
death actions, with particular emphasis on the current controversy
over the admissibility of testimony concerning future inflationary
trends in assessing damages for future earnings. Since jurors drawn
1. The court in Plourd v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 266 Ore. 666, 513 P.2d 1140 (1973)
summed up the necessity for experts in this area:
Nevertheless, it is our experience that the computation of the present value of
future wage losses or impairment of earning capacity is not a simple problem, but
involves the application of mathematical principles beyond the understanding of most
lay jurors and that attorneys and judges themselves sometimes have difficulty in
making or understanding such computations, much less explaining them in such a way
as to be understood by most lay jurors.
Id. at 676, 513 P.2d at 1145. See also Scruggs v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 320 F. Supp.
1248 (W.D.Va. 1970); Sandow v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 252 Ore. 377, 449 P.2d 426 (1969); Ritter
v. Beals, 225 Ore. 504, 358 P.2d 1080 (1961). The use of experts is employed in this area
primarily to rid the trial of an appearance of "conjecture":
It appears to us that in this particular case the element of conjecture is reduced
significantly by the admission of expert testimony as to the possible future earnings
of the decedent. It also appears that this expert testimony is not only the best evidence,
but the only evidence available in this case to prove future earnings.
Krohmer v. Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 402 P.2d 979 (1965). For more discussion on the use of expert
testimony to dispel the problem of speculation see generally Leonard, FutureEconomic Value
in Wrongful Death Litigation, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 502 (1969); O'Connor & Miller, The Economist
- Statistician:A Source of Expert Guidancein DeterminingDamages, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
354 (1972).
2. See S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH ECONOMIC HANDBOOK, § 6:3, at 87
(1970) (note particularly its world-wide ramifications at p. 94 in Table 29 which illustrates
the depreciation of the value of money in 44 countries since 1951).
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from an inflation-ridden society are aware of the impact of future
inflation, should the courts recognize it as relevant, and thus admit
testimony as to its future effects?

II.

DETERMINING A JUST COMPENSATORY AWARD

In personal injury and wrongful death actions the jury must
weigh several basic economic factors in order to determine an adequate and just damage award. These factors normally include:
1) the life and work-life expectancies of the plaintiff (decedent);
2) a determination of his earnings at the time of the accident
(death); 3) a determination of the rate at which his earning capacity would be expected to increase in the future; 4) the impact of
future income taxes on his earning capacity (depending on the jurisdiction and cause of action, this may not be a factor); and 5) a
reduction to present value of the part of the judgment consisting of
the period from the date of trial to the end of his work-life expectancy. In wrongful death actions, the jury must also consider that
portion of the future earning capacity that would have been consumed by the plaintiff, and the length of time any dependents
would have been expected to share in that earning capacity.'
To illustrate the process of determining an award for future
earnings, consider the following example of a wrongful death action.
John Jones, who was earning $20,000 a year as a construction foreman, died on January 1, 1977, at the age of fifty. The decedent's
widow brought an action under the state's wrongful death statute
against the railroad whose employee caused the death in a crossing
accident. The first facts established at trial for purposes of determining future damages must be the decedent's life and work-life
expectancies. Normally, an expert witness such as an actuary or
physician testifies by referring to standard mortality tables. The life
expectancy established by the table is not necessarily conclusive,
but will be considered along with other factors which might affect
his life span, such as his age, health, habits, and occupation., For
this example consider the life expectancy of Mr. Jones to have been
70 years and his work-life sixty-five years; thus, a median work-life
expectancy of fifteen years is admitted into evidence.
3. See discussion in text pp. 263-64 infra.
4. Holliday v. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 117 F. Supp. 729 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 212 F.2d
206 (3d Cir. 1954) (persons in hazardous occupations do not always have identical expectancies to those not so employed); Townsend v. Briggs, 99 Cal. 481, 34 P. 116 (1893) (error to
disallow evidence of plaintiff's habits as to sobriety); Borz v. Omaha Maternity & Gen. Hosp.
Ass'n, 96 Neb. 648, 148 N.W. 575 (1914) (probative value of tables may be destroyed by
evidence of ill health, disease, or hazardous employment).
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Secondly, evidence of his present salary of $20,000 is admitted,
as well as the value of any fringe benefits that might have been
accumulated at the time of death. This figure is then multiplied by
his work life expectancy of fifteen years. Thus, his total future earnings are $300,000. This sum, however, must be reduced to its
"present value" or "present worth" by the jury. The theory behind
the present value rule is that a lump sum of money given to the
plaintiff today will produce a greater amount in the future than that
for which he is entitled to be compensated, because of the capacity
for investment and accumulation of interest.5 This reduction to
present value is computed by a process of "discounting:" reducing
the award by the reasonable rate of return which could be expected
to accrue during the compensation period. The present value of the
award plus the projected amount to be earned by interest is the sum
envisioned by the jury as necessary to make the plaintiff "whole.",
There is no reduction to present value of the loss to the widow
for the period from the date of death to the date of trial because the
theory of discounting assumes that the plaintiff would have had the
use of the money, which, of course, she does not during this time
span. In a personal injury case, most jurisdictions also reduce that
portion of the award allocable to medical, nursing, and other similar
expenses. 7 On the other hand, any portion of the final award in a
personal injury action that has been assessed for future pain and
suffering has been held not to be subject to discounting to present
value.8
5. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916). Noble v. Tweedy, 90
Cal. App. 2d 738, 203 P.2d 778 (1949); Borzea v. Anselmi, 71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796 (1952).
6. An example of a sample jury instruction for the determination of present value can
be found in S. SPEisER, RECovERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 8:5, at 719-20 (2d ed. 1975).
7. McCrank v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 260 Minn. 329, 109 N.W.2d 582 (1961); Mintz
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 233 N.C. 607, 65 S.E. 2d 120(1951); Kramer v. Henely, 227
Iowa 504, 288 N.W. 610 (1939).
8. See Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Buckles, 232 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1957); Trexler v. Tug
Raven, 290 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1968), rev'd on othergrounds, 419 F.2d 536 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970); Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla.
1955); Chancey v. Shirah, 96 Ga. App. 91, 99 S.E. 2d 365 (1957); J. STEm, DAMAGES AND
REcOvERY: PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH AcnONS § 29 at 44-45 (1972). Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, S.P. & S.S.M.R.R. Co., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955) sums up why the reduction is
not attempted in this area as it is with future earning capacity:
An award for pain, suffering, and disability on a per diem basis ignores the subjective
basis of such damages. Unlike loss of earnings or the cost of a medical attendant, pain,
suffering, and disability recoveries cannot be reduced to mathematical formulae, and
on this theory they have been exempted from deductions for present worth. Each day
of suffering is a part of a whole and will vary and decrease as time goes on. To permit
a per diem evaluation of pain, suffering, and disability would plunge the already
subjective determination into absurdity by demanding accurate mathematical compu-
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Since the jury will most likely be required to reduce to present
value at least the future earnings figure, the determination of the
appropriate interest rate to be employed is very often hotly contested during the trial, due to its ultimate effect on the compensation of the plaintiff and corresponding liability of the defendant:
The interest rate employed is of great practical significance, because the higher the rate used in discounting, the lower will be the
present sum or total necessary to produce the future contributions or
accumulations. In such case the beneficiaries or the estate will get a
smaller recovery, which favors the defense. By the same token, if a
lower interest rate (or discount) is applied, the award will be higher,
favoring the beneficiaries or the estate.'
Once determined, the appropriate discount rate, plus the worklife expectancy figure are used in connection with special mathmatical tables in order to determine the reduction to present value. 0
Assume that in the case of Mr. Jones, use of his fifteen year worklife expectancy and a five percent discount rate yields the number
11.0 on the present value tables. The jury then simply multiplies
11.0 by the annual salary of $20,000 and arrives at the present value
of the lost earnings, or $220,000. A two year allotment to compensate
for the span from the date of death to the trial, $40,000, is added
without a reduction; thus, the actual damage award is $260,000.
Finally, depending upon the jurisdiction or possible cause of action,
a deduction might be required for future income taxes the decedent
would have had to pay." Also, since this is a wrongful death action,
there would most likely be a reduction for that which the deceased
would have spent on himself.
The question whether an allowance for the variable of future
inflation should be included in the six to eight economic variables
considered by the jury and established during trial has been a probtation of the present worth of an amount reached by guesswork.
Id. at 4, 68 N.W.2d at 891.
9. S. SPEISER, supra note 5, § 8:4, at 712-13.
10. For examples of these "Mathematical Tables for Reduction to Present Value" and
their complexity, see S. SPEISER, supra note 5, § 8:4, at 713-18. For a discussion of the
intricacies inherent in these tables, see 3 PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS AND DEFENSES AND
DAMAGES § 3.04(d) at 211-12 n.4 (M. Bender pub. 1965).
11. In the'recent decision, Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1976)
the Court held that both federal and state income taxes must be deducted in computing a
wrongful death award under the Federal Tort Claims Act for survivors of decedents whose
annual income at the time of death was at least $30,000. To allow the plaintiffs to recover
without the deductions would be the equivalent of "punitive" damages specifically prohibited
by the Act: "To award the full incomes to the survivors without deducting these taxes would
be to award them monetary compensation that they could not logically or reasonably have
expected to receive had decedent lived." Id. at 2203.
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lem for courts in injury and death action. Since inflation affects the
"value" of the dollars used to compensate the plaintiff for all his
damages, it would seem to be an important factor in arriving at a
final figure."2 And, because the means used to compensate the survivors or injured plaintiff is dollars, juries should be concerned not
only with the face value of the damage award, but also with its
"extrinsic" value, that which it can purchase, in order to adequately
compensate. 3 As with the establishment at trial of an appropriate
future interest rate, the admissibility of a future inflationary rate
also has a tremendous impact on both the total compensation for
the plaintiff for his lost earnings and the overall liability of the
defendant. Attorneys from both sides thus seek out experts who will
predict rates favorable to their corresponding goal of increased compensation or decreased liability:
Even with no prospect of advancement he [the deceased] could
expect periodic raises because of economy-wide increases in labor
productivity and because of general inflation. How rapid will the
increases be? The answer, in brief, is that no one knows. Here is a
ready bone of contention in the courtroom. Other things being equal,
the more rapidly wages are projected to rise in the future, the bigger
will be the estimate of the plaintiff's future earnings. The plaintiff
would like an expert who can make a case for the rampaging inflation
in the future, and the defendant would like an expert who will argue
that future inflation is likely to become at worst moderate. Both will
probably be wrong, but both certainly cannot be right. The force of
one's rhetoric in the courtroom may sway opinion, but it will not
change an unknown future.2

To illustrate the magnitude of the impact, and why defense
attorneys are opposed to such testimony, consider the case of Mr.
Jones. If the court permitted a jury to review testimony that the
12. WEBSTER'S THmD NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcrIONARY 1159 (1971) defines "inflation" as:
"an increase in the volume of money and credit relative to available goods resulting in a
substantial and continuing rise in the general price level - contrasted with deflation."
13. See Note, Fluctuating Dollars and Tort Damage Verdicts, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 264
(1948):
At the outset, it is essential to distinguish between the intrinsic and extrinsic value
of money. Although the intrinsic value is set by Congress in terms of gold content, there
is no legislation which purports to regulate the extrinsic value at which money shall
circulate, that is, its value in relation to commodities.
Id. at 265.

14.

Carlson, Economic Analysis v. Courtroom Controversy: The Present Value of Fu-

ture Earnings,62 ABA. L.J. 628, 629 (1976). Dr. Carlson, an economist, feels that the controversy between attorneys over what should be the "present value" of future earnings can be
resolved. He concludes that the discount rate which is used to determine the "present value"
of future gross earnings should be equal to, and thus offset, "projected economy-wide wage
increases."

Published by eCommons, 1977

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:2

future rate of inflation was five percent, that would offset the five
percent discount rate-leaving the widow with $340,000 instead of
the reduced amount of $260,000.
III.

ADMISSIBLE PREDICTION OR UNBRIDLED SPECULATION?

Despite the fact that recent decisions have labeled the use of
expert testimony on future rates of inflation as a "novel" question,
for many years it has been held that courts may take into account
future prospects of inflation or deflation in fixing damages for personal injuries.'" Consideration of an "increased cost of living" and
the "impaired purchasing power of the dollar" have been scrutinized when the adequacy or inadequacy of a jury award has been
challenged." Inflation was a topic of concern for both judges and
juries in personal injury cases long before the current debate over
the admission of expert testimony to forecast future inflationary
trends:
The court may also take account of future prospects of inflation or
deflation, in fixing personal injury damages. The basis of this rule is
that compensation means compensation in money, and the value of
money lies not in its intrinsic worth but in what it will buy.
It has been held proper for lawyers to argue to a jury that a
change in the purchasing power of money or a recent change in economics, generally, should be considered in arriving at an award ...
Further, this change in the value of money is so much a matter of
common knowledge, that judicial notice of the change may be taken
by the court in a personal injury action, although evidence of the
change has not been introduced. 7
The increased recognition of the need for analysis of future,
as well as present inflationary trends-which traditionally have
been considered-has continued to grow over the last five years.
From this legal controversy there has evolved a particular set of8
arguments on behalf of admitting an expert's data on that subject.'
15. Calihan v. Yellow Cab Co., 125 Cal. App. 649, 13 P.2d 931 (1932); Richey v. Service
Ry. Cleaners, 28 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 1946); Henwood v. Moore, 203 S.W. 2d 973 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947). The court in Weadock v. Eagle Indemnity Co., 15 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 1943) 34
years ago acknowledged the need for a consideration of future inflation: "[t]he decreased
purchasing power of the American dollar, with little or no prospect for any change, except
probably further decrease, for many years, is a pertinent factor to be taken into consideration
in determining the award." Id. at 146.
16. See 3 PERSONAL INJURY AcTiONS, supra note 7, § 3.04(9), at 217-19; 22 AM. JUR. 2d
Damages § 365 (1965).
17. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 87 (1965) (footnotes omitted). See also 25A C.J.S.
Damages § 197 (1966).
18. United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975); Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
Co. v. Garrison, 336 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1976); Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974);
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Some courts have adopted a "middle" ground between permitting
such expert testimony and disregarding future inflation altogether,
by allowing juries to consider inflation "generally" but not expert
evidence forcasting a specific rate of inflation in the future. 9
The principal cases supporting admissibility of expert testimony on inflation in computing future damages use several grounds
to support that theory. One approach argues that inflation is a fact
of life and something which all citizens can both relate to and must
account for in their own financial affairs.2 0 Therefore, jurors drawn
from this same segment of society are personally aware of the effects
of inflation, for it cannot easily be ignored. Since inflation is such a
universal concern, the jury will probably take it into consideration
even without an economist's projections. Some courts have allowed
the jury to consider inflationary additions to the final figure of damages in order to permit the injured individual or decedent's survivor
to keep up with an increasing cost of living.2 ' To take the opposite
position would require a court to "take the position of an ostrich
with his head in the sand.- Economic reality requires us to consider
not only what the plaintiff is to receive in theory, but in fact." 2
Loetzerich v. Texas Pac.-Missouri Pac. Terminal R.R., 325 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 1976);
Resner v. N. Pac. Ry., 161 Mont. 177, 505 P.2d 86 (1973); Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp.
Co., 266 Ore. 666, 513 P.2d 1140 (1973). Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1976)
adequately clarified this viewpoint:
In holding that expert economic testimony is admissible in actions for wrongful
death on the issue of the effect of inflation on the survivor's future pecuniary loss, we
are aware that not all courts share this view. In our judgment, however, it is simply
unrealistic to ignore the problem of inflation in this context. Given the enormity of the
potential impact of rising costs over a long period of time, we conclude that evidence
of informed estimates of future inflationary trends will result in damage awards that
are fair and just.
Id. at 743.
19. See Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1975); Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp.,
516 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975); Bach v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117, (6th Cir. 1974);
Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 474, 483, 341 A.2d 613, 617, 622 (1975). In Bach,
502 F.2d at 1122 and Riha, 516 F.2d at 843-45, the courts allowed an instruction permitting
the jury to consider the element of inflation though not permitting actual economist's testimony.
20. Seaboard Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Garrison, 336 So. 2d 423, 424 (Fla. 1976).
21. Stringfellow v. Rambo, 277 Ala. 349, 351, 170 So. 2d 494, 496 (1965); Resner v. N.
Pac. Ry., 161 Mont. 177, 180, 505 P.2d 86, 91 (1973); Scofield v. J.W. Jones Construction Co.,
64 N.M. 319, 325, 328 P.2d 389, 394 (1958).
22. Resner v. N. Pac. Ry., 161 Mont. 177, 186, 505 P.2d 86, 91 (1973). Other cases
approving an allowance for inflation include In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652,
660 (E.D. La. 1971); Scruggs v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 320 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Va.
1970); Brinegar v. San Ore Construction Co., 302 F. Supp. 630, 643 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Brooks
v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 629, 634 (D.S.C. 1967); State v. Daley, 287 N.E.2d 552,
556 (Ind. 1972); Lucivero v. Long Island R.R., 22 Misc. 2d 674, 677, 200 N.Y.S.2d 728, 730
(Sup. Ct. 1960); Martin v. Southern Ry. Co., 225 Tenn. 77, 80, 463 S.W.2d 690, 692 (1971).
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Consistent with this notion of recognizing "economic reality" is
the argument that to disregard inflation is to assume the decedent
or injured party would have worked at the same wage forever or "as
if he had contracted to work his remaining work-life expectancy at
the same salary he was earning on his date of death without any pay
raises contemplated. ' 23 Under this theory, it is relevant to have an
economist testify as to future wage increases based on a combina4
tion of inflation and increased productivity. One commentator
analyzing the fiction of the fixed wage has arrived at a similar conclusion:
More importantly, the plaintiff's position must be considered. To
base a future-compensating award on present wage levels relegates
beneficiaries to fixed income status. If inflation occurs, as is reasonable to assume, plaintiff will not have been compensated for the loss,
since decedent would not have worked at fixed wages throughout his
work-life .25
The Alaska Supreme Court in Beaulieu v. Elliott,2 a personal
injury action, also examined the subject of future wage increases
and inflation. Recognizing that annual inflation at a varying rate
has been and will continue to exist, the court held it a proper subject
for judicial scrutiny. Specifically, the Beaulieu court held that the
loss of future earnings should not be discounted to "present value"
because "inflation . . . offsets the interest that could be earned
on. . . . 'safe' investments." This line of reasoning is in direct
conflict with the reasoning in Johnson v. PenrodDrilling Co. 18 where
the court held that inflationary surcharges need not be added to the
final computation of damages because that factor would be taken
23. Demos, Measure of Damages - Wrongful Death, 60 ILL. BAR J. 518, 521 (1972).
24. Dennis, Sirmon, Drinkwater, Wrongful Death Damages-FairCompensation for
Future Pecuniary Loss Requires Consideration of Economic Trends and Income Tax
Consequences, 47 Miss. L.J. 173 (1976). For some enlightening appendices showing human
life value calculations with earnings adjustments for inflation, see 204-09.
25. Id. at 183.
26. 434 P.2d 665 (Ala. 1967).
27. Id. at 671. As well as using the interest rate on "safe" investments to discount an
award, the "legal" rate of interest has also been adopted by courts in the past. See Jones v.
Friesel, 207 F. Supp. 925 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Florida Cent. & Pac. R. Co. v. Burney, 98 Ga. 1,
26 S.E. 730 (1895). See also Annot., 105 A.L.R. 234 (1936) for a general discussion of the
determination of discount rates.
28. 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975). The court held: "[Ihf future inflation does cause higher
wages, experience predictably demonstrates that higher rates on investments which have
always accompanied inflation will also occur and this factor will mitigate the failure to
include an inflationary surcharge in wage rate calculations." Id. at 236. It has also been
mentioned that inflation will be taken into account because the plaintiff can invest his award
in "equities such as land and thus have the benefit of both inflation and income." Schnebley
v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708, 727 (Iowa 1974).
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into consideration by these same "safe" investment rates discussed
in Beaulieu. The Johnson court held that the interest rates on these
investments (plaintiff's damage award) will increase in proportion
to the inflationary rate so that discounting is proper. The question
then arises, however, whether or not the plaintiff would be adequately compensated if these interest rates did not in fact keep up
with a spiraling inflationary rate. The jury should be allowed to take
that possible imbalance into consideration.
Besides these arguments for admissibility, it has also been held
that because a future rate of inflation is "uncertain" or cannot be
determined with exactitude is an insufficient reason for totally disregarding its existence: "Juries are constantly called upon to evaluate the effect of future or hypothetical events. '29 The fact that the
court is dealing with "hypotheticals" or "educated guesses" when
projecting inflation is not a function unknown in the courtroom:
While there is no certainty to the future, this is an inadequate ground
for the exclusion of an educated guess. Mortality tables obviously do
not purport to state exactly when a particular individual will die, but
they do provide a reasonable estimate, fair to plaintiff and defendant,
while reducing the jury's scope of conjecture. Similar logic should be
applied to the issue of consideration of future economic trends. 0
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Eng3
lish, an action for personal injuries under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, agreed with the proposition that "reasonable predictions" are
not so foreign to the legal arena. Most predictions are uncertain to
an extent, but that alone is a poor excuse not to strive to ascertain
them:
While predicting future inflationary trends, or extrapolating from
present ones, may be speculative, so are most predictions courts
make about future incomes, expenses (as, for example, in the case of
the wrongful death of an infant). Since it is still more probable that
there will in the future be changes in the purchasing power of the
dollar, it is better to try as best we can to predict them rather than
32
to ignore them altogether.
Proponents of the admissibility of expert testimony on future
29. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Garrison, 336 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. 1976).
30. 47 Miss. L.J., supra note 23 at 182 n.49.
31. United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63 (9th cir. 1975).
32. Id. at 75. For added authority that the decreasing power of the dollar has been held
to be a proper factor for consideration in calculating an award for future loss of wages see,
Goutierrez v. Travelers Insurance Co., 107 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1959); Edwards v. Simms,
294 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 1974).
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inflation urge that a consideration of probabilities is essential in a
determination of a "just" award. They concede, however, that certain precautions must still be adopted to insure that the evidence
presented to the jury is nevertheless "competent." 3 To satisfy the
requirement of "competency" the judge should limit the jury's inquiry to those estimates of future changes in the purchasing power
of money which can be "based on sound and substantial economic
evidence, and . . . can be postulated with some reliability."' 4
Thus, the advocates of expert testimony on future inflation
stress 1) economic reality, 2) the underlying concept of all compensatory damages-making the plaintiff "whole," 3) the fictional nature of the fixed future wage, and 4) that statistical predictions by
economists in this area are as "reliable" as forecasting life expectancy and future interest rates. Yet at the same time they realize the
need for guidelines to establish a foundation for the evidence that
is to be admitted.
Those opposed to admitting expert testimony on future inflation basically argue that reduction to "present value" is still the
best rule to be followed; and that any testimony as to future rates
of inflation which might affect that reduction is mere conjecture and
too speculative.3 Although the issue has come up in different contexts in the federal courts, many have disallowed inflationary additions to future earnings.3 For example, in Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., the Fifth Circuit held not only that the influence of possible
inflation on future lost earnings is too speculative a matter for judicial determination, but also that a jury should be instructed not to
consider other signposts of inflation such3 7as the purchasing power
of the dollar or the consumer price index.
33. The dangers inherent in making predictions about the future of economic conditions
have been recognized along with their advantages. See Bach v. Penn. Central Transp. Co.,
502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974).
34. United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 76 (9th Cir. 1975). Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d
726 (3rd Cir. 1976) also indicated: "The plaintiff, however, bears the burden of proof and it
is the responsibility of the plaintiff to provide for the jury some evidentiary and logical basis
for calculating or, at least rationally estimating a compensatory award." Id. at 743-44.
35. Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975); Frankel v. Heym, 466
F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); Murphy v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 444 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1971);
Henderson v. S.C. Loveland Co., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Fla. 1975); Raines v. New York
Central R.R. Co., 129 Ill. App.2d 294, 263 N.E.2d 895 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, 51 Ill.
2d 428, 283 N.E.2d 230 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972).
36. Magill v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 464 F.2d 294, 301 (3rd Cir. 1972); Petition
of United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256, 1280 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987
(1971); United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965, 970-71 (9th Cir. 1967).
37. The reasoning used in Penrod by the Fifth Circuit that inflation is too "speculative"
to be considered in the computation of lost future earnings has been extended to the area of
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Similarly, in Williams v. United States" the First Circuit held
that in fixing damages for wrongful death anticipated future earnings should not be increased in an attempt to account for possible
future inflation. And, the Sixth Circuit held that a lower court
erroneously awarded damages without reducing them to present
worth on the basis that inflationary trends would offset any present
worth reduction.' Sleeman v. Cheaspeake & Ohio R. Ry. 0 epitomizes the position that "unbridled speculation" on future rates of
inflation leads nowhere and merely establishes precedent that may
allow "speculation" to become admissible in other areas as well:
Of course, the nation's economic history since the 1930's would
appear to make the use of present wages as the standard for loss of
future earnings somewhat unfair to plaintiffs. But as to the future,
the inflation versus deflation debate rages inconclusively at the highest policy levels of our government, in national electoral campaigns,
in learned economic journals and is exemplified by the daily gyrations of the stock markets. The debate seems unlikely to be resolved
satisfactorily in one personal injury trial. And if testimonial resolution of this factor bearing on the future is attempted, the door is open
to similarly speculative and debatable offsets tending in other directions."
One of the primary authorities cited in the opinions holding
such testimony inadmissible is F. Harper and F. James, Law of
Torts.12 In that volume, the authors discussed the speculation inherent in future damages and concluded that the only logical position
is to retain the basic rule of reducing awards to their present value:
Future trends in the value of money are necessarily unknown and so
always render such damages speculative in a way we cannot escape. .

.

. It is not at all clear that courts would be willing to hear

experts on the matter, or that they would get much real help if they
did. For the most part the problem which is inevitably present in
property damages. See Freeport Sulphur Co. v. S/S Hermosa, 526 F.2d 300, 308 (5th Cir.
1976). The Fifth Circuit in Matter of S/S Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 1976) also
remanded a district court decision where the judges had not followed the dictates of Penrod
and had offset the discounting to present value by considering the effects of inflation in
determining several wives' damages for loss of support.
38. 435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1970).
39. Sleeman v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1969).
40. Id. at 307.
41. Id. at 308. This argument of not wanting to open the door to testimony on other
"hypothetical matters" in the courtroom seems to be one of the most valid for this side of
the controversy. See also McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
42. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW op ToRTs § 25.11 (1956).
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every case of future loss is not analyzed and the present value of
money is assumed to be the proper basis. 3
Despite authority such as Harper and James and recent court decisions which hold the nature of such expert testimony to be "too
speculative," there has been growing criticism of this position not
only in other courts but in scholarly journals as well."
It should also be noted, as was stated earlier,4 5 that the concept
of inflation in these actions may be considered at different levels.
Recent decisions on the "inadmissibility" of expert evidence on
future inflation have been made in the context of cases focused
primarily on predicting future wage increases, and thus do not address the issue of whether the jury may consider present inflationary
economic trends when arriving at a verdict, or whether an appeals
court can note the decreased purchasing power of the dollar when
reviewing a lower court's decision. The reasoning behind using evidence or taking judicial notice of inflation in the latter two situations, however, should also be applied by analogy to its consideration in future wage projections.
It would seem from the plethora of literature and court decisions in this area that a trend is discernible in the direction of the
acceptance of the admissibility of expert economic testimony on the
subject of future inflation in personal injury and wrongful death
actions. This viewpoint appears to be not only the most rational
position, but by far the most equitable. It is most consistent with
the underlying theory of compensatory damages: to strive to make
the plaintiff "whole" by giving him the value of what he would have
received in the future had it not been for the negligence of the
defendant.
It has long been established that a jury can consider "economic
conditions" and the "present purchasing power of money" in com43. Id. at 1325-26. Henderson, in 40 INS. COUNSEL J., infra note 44, at 430, indicates that
the 1968 supplement to this prestigious authority has changed the weight of this statement
by accepting the "fact" of inflation.
44. Henderson, The Consideration of Increased Productivity and the Discounting of
Future Earnings to Present Value, 20 S.D. L. REV. 307, 308-10 (1975); Henderson, Some
Recent Decisions on Damages; with Special Reference to Questions of Inflation and Income
Taxes, 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 423, 428-32 (1973); Comment, Future Inflation as an Element of
Damages in Alabama, 5 CUMB.-SAM. L. REV. 72-74 (1974); Note, Future Inflation and the
Undercompensated Plaintiff, 4 LOYOLA U. CHICAGO L.J. 359 (1973); Comment, Damages for
Loss of Future Income: Accounting for Inflation, 6 SAN. FRAN. L. REv. 311 (1972); Note,
Damages Adjusting Future Earnings for Inflation, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 138, 152 (1976); Note,
Damages-FutureInflation-Fact of Possible Future Inflation will not be Included in.the
Calculation of Future Damages, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 432, 439 (1975); Comment, "Inflation and
Future Loss of Earnings",27 BAYLOR L. REV. 281, 291 (1975).
45. See generally cases cited notes 16 and 17 supra.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss2/6

19771

COMMENT

ing to a final figure. Because inflation, both present and future,
seems to be an essential ingredient of the former and a synonym for
the latter, inflation is indeed relevant in accomplishing full compensation for the plaintiff. A reviewing court can consider current economic trends in determining whether a jury verdict is excessive; it
seems no less germane to consider future economic trends when a
verdict is similarly scrutinized. Thus, "future" inflation is no less
relevant than its present rate, which juries and judges sitting as
triers of fact are already allowed to consider: "We must remember
that the problem for the jury is death cases, is the future-future
earnings, and concomitant contributions or accumulations. The
past is only one guide to the future, and it is not conclusive by any
means."46
Is the "speculation" or "unreliability" inherent in future interest rates, projection and allowance for future income tax rates, and
predictions of life and work-life expectancy, different from a labor
economist's statistical predictions as to future rates of inflation?
The basic concern in damage actions is to compensate; in order to
actually accomplish that result, the real value of the dollars
awarded not only now but in the future, that is, present and future
"purchasing power" of that money must be of the utmost concern
for the trier of fact. In order to fill its normal function of compensation, the jury must be given all the relevant information which may
affect its final assessment. Although the present value of a damage
award coincides with its real value at the time it is awarded, juries
should not be allowed to ignore the fact that inflation gradually
diminishes the purchasing power of those dollars. The result is an
eventual inequity between the amount awarded and the intended
value of that judgment. The basic concern for the courts would seem
to be not whether there will be inflation or deflation in the future,
but the most accurate projection of the reality of future inflation.
Since it appears in the interests of justice to consider predictions of future rates of inflation, courts need to be given guidance
in formulating more consistent standards to judge the competency
of admissible expert testimony. The jury should not be left to speculate on its own as to the future. Experts should present evidence
subject to effective cross-examination.4 7 Hopefully state and federal
46. S. SPEISER, supra note 6, § 8:10, at 740.
47. S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 13:2, at 208 feels that in selecting an economist to testify
on the subject of appraising earnings there are seven essential qualifications that must be
met:
1. Field of formal study: economic theory, labor economics, mathematics, statistics.
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case law will develop various tests for evaluating the experts' competency, and the statistical bases for their projections will become
more uniform. Also, state legislatures may follow the steps of Rhode
Island, which has settled the issue of admissibility by passing a
statute specifically declaring the admissibility of expert projections
on the issue of inflation."
V.

CONCLUSION

Inflation has been and most likely will continue to be a problem
with which all of us will have to deal in planning our financial
futures. It is virtually an established facet of our contemporary society and a variable with which the injured party or decedent would
have had to wrestle had he continued working. Thus it would seem
to be a factor that must be taken into account when the court comes
to a conclusion concerning the future damages these individuals or
their survivors should receive, particularly in the area of future
earnings. If it is not taken into the jury room, as a court has so
perceptively noted,49 our judicial system will be ignoring a blatant
and ever-increasing economic reality-transforming itself into the
proverbial "ostrich with its head in the sand."5 0
Ogden K. Montgomery
2. Experience: university or college teaching at a tenured academic rank with demonstrated capacity for research and experience in appraisal work, including testimony at
trial.
3. Degree: doctorate in economics.
4. Publication in the field of economics in recognized leading scholarly journals.
5. Related employment: government service or consulting work, with government
and industry.
6. Membership: American Economic Association.
7. Computer familiarity: knowledge of computers and of computer programming.
48. R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 10-7-1.1.3 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1976) in relation to wrongful
death actions provides:
Reduce the remainder thus ascertained to its present value as of the date of the
award. In determining said award, evidence shall be admissible concerning economic
trends, including but not limited to projected purchasing power of money, inflation
and projected increase or decrease in the costs of living.
49. Resner v. Northern Pac. Ry., 161 Mont. 177, 505 P.2d 86 (1973).
50. Id. at 186, 505 P.2d at 91.
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